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RECENT DECISIONS

VENDOR A.ND PuRCHASER - PRIORITIES As BETWEEN VENDEE's LIEN
AND INTERVENING JUDGMENT CREDITOR - In 1903 one Bekkedal purchased
certain real property, and used it for a summer home. In I 924 he and his sons
organized a corporation with himself as president, and took over the assets of
their copartnership. In I 926 the corporation made advances for improvements
on the real property of Bekkedal to the extent of nearly $9,000. A year later
auditors found that the president had overdrawn his personal account with the
corporation by about $33,000, and at their suggestion his account was credited
with the value of the property, $20,000, less the amount advanced for improvements, and the assets were marked up $20,000. In 1933 the corporation was
adjudged bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy served an order to show cause
why the property should not be conveyed to him. The president orally promised to
convey, but when the deed was presented to him, he refused to convey on the
ground that, between the date of the hearing and the presentation of the deed,
a judgment had been rendered against him for double liability on bank stock
that he owned. Subsequently he did convey to the trustee. The property was
appraised at $7500 by appraisers in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trustee
brought this action to quiet title in himself, and to set aside a sheriff's deed made
in execution of the judgment. Held, that the plaintiff's prayer be granted, as a
vendee's lien is superior to the lien of the subsequent judgment creditor. Lewis
'U. Wisconsin Banking Commission, 225 Wis. 606, 275 N. W. 429 (1937).
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It is generally held that the vendee under a land purchase contract has a
lien on the land to the extent of his payments on the contract/ and that this
lien is ordinarily superior to interests arising subsequently.2 The cases are in
confusion as to the basis of this lien, but it is generally agreed that it is not based
on the contract.8 This is illustrated by cases granting a lien where the contract
is unenforceable because of the statute of frauds, or void by statute.4 The cases
have relied on the implication of a trust,5 unjust enrichment,6 the converse of a
grantor's lien, 1 or a blending of the three. However, any authority that can be
found on the precise point requires that the vendee under a parol contract be in
possession to assert his lien against subsequent judgment creditors.8 It is to be
1

33 MicH. L. REv. 108 ,(1934); 4 UNiv. CIN. L. REv. 368 (1930); 45
A. L. R. 353 (1926); Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. II3 at 124, 84 N. E. 937
(1908), where the court said, "Whether the foundation of the lien is natural equity,
imputed intention, partial ownership, the implication of a trust, or a blending of some
of these sources, the authorities, almost without exception in those jurisdictions which
give a lien to the vendor, are clear that one exists." Contra, Young v. Walker, 224
Mass. 491, II3 N. E. 363 (1916).
2
37 C. J. 328, § 40 (1925); Everett v. Mansfield, (C. C. A. ISt, 1906) 148
F. 374, 8 Ann. Cas. 956, secured claimant in bankruptcy; Steele v. Citizens' State
Bank, II6 Kan. 510, 227 P. 352 (1924), secured claimant in receivership; Franklin
Finance Co. v. Bowden, 36 Ohio App. 19, 172 N. E. 698 (1930), preferred over
subsequent mortgagee with notice; Larson v. Metcalf, 201 Iowa 1208, 207 N. W. 382,
45 A. L. R. 344 at 353 (1926), preferred over subsequent purchaser with notice. The
decisions seem to agree that priority dates from actual payment. See Green v. Linnhaven Orchard Co., 89 Ore. 513, 174 P. 620 (1918); First Savings Bank v. Linnhaven Orchard Co., 89 Ore. 354, 174 P. 614 (1918); I BLACK, JUDGMENTS, 2d ed.,
40 (1902); McClanahan v. Norfolk & W.R. R., 122 Va. 705, 96 S. E. 453 (1918),
superior judgment creditor.
s 33 MICH. L. REV. 108 (1934); 39 CYc. 2034 (1912); Elterman v. Hyman,
192 N. Y. II3, 84 N. E. 937 (1908). But note the inconsistency of courts refusing
to grant a lien in an action to rescind on the ground of fraud. Davis v. William Rosenweig Realty Operating Co., 192 N. Y. 128, 84 N. E. 943 (1908); 8 CoL. L. REv.
571 (1908). Contra, Vaughn v. Vaughn, IOO Tenn. 282, 45 S. W. 677 (1898);
Bullitt v. Eastern Ky. Land Co., 99 Ky. 324, 36 S. W. 16 (1896).
4
Union Inv. Co. v. Abell, 148 Minn. 229, 181 N. W. 353 (1921), where
there was a later conveyance; Fleming v. Fleming, 202 Mich. 615, 168 N. W. 457
(1918); Lefferson v. Dallas, 20 Ohio St. 68 (1870); Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y.
II3, 84 N. E. 937 (1908).
11
Pullman Car & Mfg. Corp. v. Stroh, 349 Ill. 492, 182 N. E. 399 (1932).
8
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, § 161 (1936): "Where property of one person
can by proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the
ground that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises."
The court in the principal case relied on this authority, though the Restatement does
not here refer specifically to the vendee's lien.
7
3 PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed. § 1263 (1918).
8
Voorheis v. Eiting, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 161, 22 S. W. 80 (1893); Elliot v. Walker,
145 Ky. 71 at 73, 140 S. W. 51 (19II), where it was said, "but we know of no
case holding that purchaser by parol who is not in possession ••• has been adjudged
a lien for the amount paid." Chrisman v. Greer, 239 Ky. 373, 39 S. W. (2d) 676,
87 A. L. R. 1500 at 1505 (1931), where a subsequent conveyance was upheld as against
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noted that the principal case overlooked this difficulty, since the vendor remained
in possession of the property. It is submitted that the court was justified, since
the requirement is without basis. Any requirement of possession would involve
confusion between equitable liens and the common-law possessory liens, 9 though
possession might serve the function of providing notice to prevent a purchaser
from cutting off an equitable interest.10 It would seem that neither factor should
be considered in determining priorities between equitable interests. Regardless
of the theory advanced as the basis of the vendee's lien, it is equitable and
remedial. The judgment creditor is not a bona fide purchaser, but the possessor
of a subsequent interest, attaching only to the vendor's actual interest in the
land:11 Since the judgment creditor's interest cannot exceed that of the vendor,
it is only the right of redemption, valueless in this case. It should be noted that
the principal case employs the vendee's lien for a novel purpose. Its usual function
is to insure restitution to the vendee on the vendee's rescission for fraud or breach
of contract. Here the oral contract to convey had been performed by the vendor,
and the purchaser was seeking to quiet a title derived from the executed deed.
Since the president withdrew funds of the corporation to improve his property,
and since the officers of a corporation are in a fiduciary relation with it,1 2 the
court might have justified the conveyance to the trustee in bankruptcy on the
ground of a constructive trust.18 However, it may have been more difficult to
find a breach of the fiduciary duty than to spell out the elements of contract to
convey the land. The result justifies the unusual application of the vendee's lien,
since the equities are strongly in favor of the corporation as against a subsequent
judgment creditor.
Arthur A. Greene

creditors. There is conflict as to whether the full purchase price must be paid in order
that a judgment creditor's lien be junior to that of the vendee. Holding that it is not:
McClanahan, Admr. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 122 Va. 705, 96 S. E. 453 (1918), overruling Fulkerson v. Taylor, 102 Va. 314, 46 S. E. 309 (1904).
9 1 JoNES, LtENs, 3d ed., § 21 (1914).
10 Union Inv. Co. v. Abell, 148 Minn. 229, 181 N. W. 353 (1921), where
the court held that the judgment creditor could not cut off the lien of the vendee,
because possession by vendee was notice of the lien.
11 Snyder v. Martin, 17 W. Va. 276 at 299, 41 Am. Rep. 670 (1880), "It is
well settled that a judgment-lien on the land of the debtor is subject to every equity
which existed against the debtor at the rendition of the judgment; and courts of equity
will always limit the lien to the actual interest of the judgment debtor." Filley v.
Duncan, l Neb. 134, 93 Am. Dec. 337 (1871); French v. De Bow, 38 Mich. 708
(1878); RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ 173 (1936); Jones v. Chenault, 124 Ala. 610,
27 So. 515 (1900). In regard to chattels, see In re Interborough Consol. Corp., (C.
C. A. 2d, 1923) 288 F. 334, 32 A. L. R. 932 at 950.
12 Lucia Mining Co. v. Evans, 146 App. Div. 416, 131 N. Y. S. 280 (19n).
18 Smith v. Green, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 243 S. W. 1006. A resulting trust
cannot be imposed because it must arise at time of acquisition of title. Baughman v.
Baughman, 283 Ill. 55, II9 N. E. 49 (1918).

